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Abstract
■ Effective adaptation to the demands of a changing environ-
ment requires flexible cognitive control. The medial and the
lateral frontal cortices are involved in such control processes,
putatively in close interplay with the BG. In particular, dopami-
nergic projections from the midbrain (i.e., from the substantia
nigra [SN] and the ventral tegmental area) have been proposed
to play a pivotal role in modulating the activity in these areas
for cognitive control purposes. In that dopaminergic involve-
ment has been strongly implicated in reinforcement learning,
these ideas suggest functional links between reinforcement
learning, where the outcome of actions shapes behavior over
time, and cognitive control in a more general context, where
no direct reward is involved. Here, we provide evidence from
functional MRI in humans that activity in the SN predicts sys-
tematic subsequent trial-to-trial RT prolongations that are
thought to reflect cognitive control in a stop-signal paradigm.
In particular, variations in the activity level of the SN in one trial
predicted the degree of RT prolongation on the subsequent
trial, consistent with a modulating output signal from the SN
being involved in enhancing cognitive control. This link be-
tween SN activity and subsequent behavioral adjustments lends
support to theoretical accounts that propose dopaminergic con-
trol signals that shape behavior both in the presence and in the
absence of direct reward. This SN-based modulatory mecha-
nism is presumably mediated via a wider network that deter-
mines response speed in this task, including frontal and parietal
control regions, along with the BG and the associated subtha-
lamic nucleus. ■
INTRODUCTION
Effective behavioral adaptation to the demands of a chang-
ing environment requires flexible cognitive control. Phys-
iologically, the medial and the lateral frontal cortices have
been frequently linked to such control processes, puta-
tively in close interplay with the BG (Frank, Woroch, &
Curran, 2005; Pasupathy & Miller, 2005; Holroyd & Coles,
2002; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001;
Gehring & Knight, 2000; Carter et al., 1998). Preceding ac-
tual control adjustments, the need for behavioral adapta-
tion has to be detected, and various studies have related
the ACC to this process, although its actual role in this con-
text is not settled (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004).
Irrespective of where the necessity to adapt control set-
tings is initially registered, the control signals have to be
directed to the relevant areas that mediate behavioral
adaptations. Prominent theoretical accounts posit that a
control signal from the midbrain may induce adjustments
in brain areas that actually implement the cognitive con-
trol. In particular, dopaminergic projections from the
midbrain (i.e., mainly the substantia nigra [SN] and the
ventral tegmental area [VTA]) to the frontal cortex and
the BG have been proposed to play a pivotal role in modu-
lating activity in these areas for cognitive control purposes
(Brown & Braver, 2005; Frank et al., 2005; Montague,
Hyman, & Cohen, 2004; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, &
Nieuwenhuis, 2004; Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg,
Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004; Holroyd & Coles, 2002). These
accounts explicitly emphasize commonalities to a dopa-
minergic “teaching signal” that has been suggested to
underlie reinforcement learning (e.g., Schultz, 2000).
Reinforcement-learning theories posit that actions leading
to reward are reinforced by a phasic increase in dopami-
nergic neuronal activity, whereas actions that repeatedly
fail to yield reward are associated with a phasic suppres-
sion of dopaminergic activity, indicating the need for be-
havioral adjustment. Several computational models have
proposed a similar mechanism for cognitive control even
in the absence of direct reward. In these models, condi-
tions leading to stronger cognitive control, such as the
commission of errors, are taken to be similar to conditions
of reward omission, with both leading to subsequent be-
havioral adjustments (Brown & Braver, 2005; Frank et al.,
2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Braver & Cohen, 2000).
Following this notion, conditions of stronger cognitive
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control would be expected to be preceded by lower activ-
ity in the SN or VTA.
Here, we used thewell-established stop-signal paradigm
(Figure 1A; Logan, 1994) to investigate the relationship
between specific neural activity elicited by different trial
types and subsequent behavioral adaptation (Figure 1B).
In this paradigm, which consists of frequent go trials (GTs)
and less frequent stop trials (STs), systematic RT prolon-
gations have frequently been reported on trials following
an ST, presumably indicative of a modulation of cognitive
control (Boehler et al., 2009; Enticott, Bradshaw, Bellgrove,
Upton, & Ogloff, 2009; Li et al., 2008). Addressing the neu-
ral mechanisms related to these sequential behavioral
adjustments, we used fMRI (Figure 1C) to examine the re-
lationship between the neural activity elicited by stop and
GTs to the RT on the subsequent GT. Given the prediction
that lower dopamine neuron activity signals the need for
stronger cognitive control, we hypothesized an inverse re-
lationship between GT RTs and SN or VTA activity elicited
by preceding STs but not by preceding GTs (Figure 1D).
METHODS
Participants
Twelve subjects participated in this study (6 women,mean
age = 24.5). All subjects had correct or corrected-to-
normal visual acuity, and none of them reported a history
of psychiatric or neurological disorders. All gave written
informed consent and were paid for participation. The
experiment was approved by the ethics committee of
the Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg.
Task
The task in this experiment was adopted from a stop-signal
paradigm used in an earlier magneto-encephalographic
study (Figure 1A; Boehler et al., 2009); it only differed
in the between-trial timing to meet the requirements of
fMRI. The stop-signal paradigm employs two types of trials
that are presented in a random sequence: the frequent
GTs, where a response to a choice-reaction stimulus is re-
quired, and the less-frequent STs, where the presentation
of a stop-signal rapidly succeeding the choice-reaction
stimulus indicates that the response needs to be stopped.
In GTs, which accounted for 60% of all trials, a green
German traffic light symbol was presented for 800 msec,
and subjects had to decide whether it was oriented to
the left or right (mapped to the right index and middle
finger; the task-relevant stimulus was surrounded by four
task-irrelevant green traffic light signs of random left/right
orientation (not depicted in Figure 1A; see Boehler et al.,
2009). STs (20% of trials) started identically to GTs, but
after a certain SOA the go symbol was replaced by a red
stop sign. (Additional control conditions reported in
Boehler et al., 2009, that mimicked the visual stimulation
of GTs and STs were presented in 20% of the trials; these
randomly occurring trials were modeled as covariates of
no interest and will not be further discussed here, as the
analysis focuses exclusively on GTs that were preceded by
either another GT or by an ST.) The stop sign signaled sub-
jects to withhold their response. The SOA between the
choice-reaction stimulus and the stop sign is an impor-
tant factor determining whether subjects accomplish with-
holding the motor response (called successful STs [SST])
Figure 1. Paradigm, analysis,
and data acquisition. (A) In
the stop-signal paradigm, a
choice-reaction stimulus (here
a German traffic light sign
oriented to the left or right) is
either presented during the
entire trial (GT) or substituted
by a stop signal (ST) after a
certain time delay that is set
trial to trial by a tracking
algorithm. (Additional
irrelevant flanking items of
random orientation were
present as in Boehler et al.,
2009; see Methods.) This stop
signal indicates to withhold the
triggered response, yielding
SST and UST. (B) This study
focuses on behavioral
adaptations in GTs following
USTs (USTGT ), SSTs (SSTGT),
or GTs (GTGT). (C) Approximate
slice orientation and extent of
the acquired partial volume
overlaid on the MT template. (D) We specifically hypothesized that the activity level in the SN or VTA during STs would influence the RT in
the subsequent GT, with low activity leading to slowed subsequent responses and vice versa (the ellipsoids represent activity related to three
different STs).
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or fail to inhibit their response (called unsuccessful STs
[UST]; see Logan, 1994). Therefore, the timing of the stop
signal is usually titrated so as to yield an approximately
equivalent number of SST and UST, by on-line adapta-
tion of each subjectʼs individual SOA between the choice-
reaction stimulus and the stop sign. Specifically, the SOA
was increased by 17 msec after an SST and decreased by
the same amount after a UST. The initial SOAwas 150msec,
and the total stimulus duration was kept constant at
800 msec. A total of 1735 trials was presented, divided
between 10 runs. The intertrial interval varied pseudo-
randomly between 1.5 and 6 sec following a gamma func-
tion to allow for the separation of different conditions in
an event-related fMRI analysis.
Data Acquisition
The fMRI data were acquired on a 3-TMRI system (Siemens
Magnetom Trio, Erlangen, Germany) with EPI using a
circularly polarized eight-channel head coil (Bruker,
Ettlingen, Germany). In the functional runs, slices were
acquired parallel to the brainstem in an odd–even inter-
leaved direction that covered the midbrain, the temporal
lobe, the parts of the frontal cortex, and the cerebellum
(Figure 1C). Twenty-four T2*-weighted images (EPI se-
quence) per volume sensitive to BOLD contrast were ob-
tained (matrix size= 64× 64, 24 slices per volume, field of
view= 192× 192mm, spatial resolution= 3× 3× 3mm,
gap = 0.3 mm, echo time [TE] = 30 msec, repetition time
[TR] = 1500 msec, flip angle = 75°). For each subject,
functional data were acquired in 10 runs, each containing
252 volumes. Six additional volumes per run were
acquired at the beginning of each functional run and sub-
sequently discarded from the analysis to allow for steady-
state magnetization. In addition, structural images of each
subjectʼs entire brain were collected by T1-weighted inver-
sion recovery prepared EPI (IR-EPI) sequences (matrix
size = 64 × 64, 60 slices, field of view = 192 × 192 mm,
spatial resolution = 3 × 3 × 3 mm, gap = 0.3 mm, TE =
33 msec, inversion time = 1450 msec, TR = 15000 msec).
Data Analysis
The fMRI data were preprocessed and statistically analyzed
using the SPM5 software package (Wellcome Department
of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London,
UK) and MATLAB 7.0 (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA).
All functional images were corrected for odd/even slice
intensity differences with reference to the middle slice
acquired in time, corrected for motion artifacts by re-
alignment to the first volume, spatially normalized to a
standard T1-weighted SPM template (Ashburner & Friston,
1999) by warping the subjects anatomical IR-EPI to the
SPM template and by applying these parameters to the
functional images. The functional images were then re-
sampled to 2 × 2× 2mm and smoothed with an isotropic
4-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel, and the time-series fMRI
data were high-pass filtered (cutoff = 128 sec). For each
subject, a statistical model was computed by applying a
canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) com-
bined with time and dispersion derivatives for each of
the conditions (Friston et al., 1998). To capture resid-
ual movement-related artifacts, six covariates were in-
cluded (the three rigid-body translation and the three
rotations resulting from realignment) as regressors of
no interest.
RT Regressors
To fit hemodynamic responses with RTs on a trial-to-trial
basis, parametric modulators were introduced into the
analysis (Yarkoni, Barch, Gray, Conturo, & Braver, 2009;
Weissman, Roberts, Visscher, & Woldorff, 2006; Buchel,
Holmes, Rees, & Friston, 1998). To this end, RT variations
around each subjectʼs mean RT were extracted for each
trial and standardized across trials. These values were then
convolved with the canonical HRF for the respective or
preceding trial (see next paragraph) and entered into
the model as an additional class of basis functions that
are orthogonal to those representing the canonical HRF.
Importantly, both types of basis functions were estimated
in the same model so that the canonical HRF responses
account for general differences between the conditions,
whereas the RT regressors model the response variations
in the different conditions as a function of RT. In essence,
the RT regressors will identify areas whose activity varia-
tions correlate with the variations of the RTs from trial to
trial around the mean RT for that subject. Compared with
approaches that separate and contrast trials into con-
ditions with different RTs (e.g., a median split), this ap-
proach has the advantage of taking into account the whole
trial-to-trial variability of the hemodynamic and behavioral
responses, thus identifying brain areas that carry the same
fluctuation pattern as the behavioral variable under study
(Figure 1D).
Different Statistical Models
Two statistical models were estimated for each subject, al-
lowing assessment of different effects related to within-
trial activity and across-trial adaptations. The labeling of
trial-types is based on two different time-frames: (1) SST,
UST, and GT reflect the conditions within a given trial,
whereas (2) SSTGT, USTGT, and GTGT reflect GTs that fol-
low an SST, a UST, or a GT, respectively, thus only differ-
ing in trial history. The descriptions either refer to the
fMRI data (functional) or to the RT data (behavioral):
(i) The “f/b” model (functional and behavioral data from
the same current trial) fits the hemodynamic response
of the different trial types with the corresponding RT
regressor from that same trial (i.e., GT and UST, but
not for SST where no RTs existed because of the suc-
cessful withholding of the response).
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(ii) The “f / (b+1)”model (functional data of one trial and
behavioral data of the next GT) fits the hemodynamic
responses of SST, UST, and GT (that are followed by a
GT) with the RT fluctuations of that subsequent GT
(SSTGT, USTGT, and GTGT). This analysis thus captures
the influence of brain activity in one trial on the RT in
the next trial.
In both models, only correct GTs and STs were ana-
lyzed, whereas all other trial types weremodeled as regres-
sors of no interest. Furthermore, in the f / (b + 1) model,
only trials were included into the relevant conditions that
were succeeded by a correct GT. The parameter esti-
mates resulting from each condition/contrast and sub-
ject (first-level analysis) were entered into a second-level
random-effects group analysis using one-sample t tests
(thresholded at p < .001 and k = 4 contiguous voxels
for the midbrain and k = 10 contiguous voxels for activa-
tions outside of the midbrain). In addition, p value correc-
tion was performed using Gaussian field theory with
respect to the whole acquired volume (thresholded at
an uncorrected p value level of p < .001), and results that
were significant on the cluster level ( p < .05) are high-
lighted in the result tables. The significance of the acti-
vated clusters in the SN was assessed by using small
volume correction (SVC; Worsley et al., 1996) with respect
to a manual segmentation of the bilateral SN. To further
account for the small volume, ROI analyses in the SN were
performed on the unsmoothed data of the single subjects.
Functional parameter estimates were extracted using the
MarsBar software package (http://marsbar.sourceforge.
net/). The ROI that was used to characterize activity in
the SN was determined from the average activity of all
three parametric modulators of interest in the f / (b + 1)
model (GTGT, USTGT, and SSTGT) to avoid introducing a
bias for any condition. This analysis was thresholded at
p < .01, identifying an eight-voxel cluster in the right SN.
Because of the complete lack of any activity in the SN in
the f/b model, this ROI was also used to extract activity
estimates for the f/bmodel. To verify the anatomical local-
ization of structures within the midbrain, the activation
maps were superimposed on a magnetization transfer
(MT) template, which was derived from averaging the nor-
malized MT image of 33 young adults (Bunzeck & Duzel,
2006). On MT images, the SN region can be distinguished
from surrounding structures as a bright stripe whereas the
adjacent red nucleus appears dark. Activation maps were
overlaid on the anatomical data usingMRIcro (http://www.
sph.sc.edu/comd/rorden/mricro.html). Statistical assess-
ment of the behavioral and ROI data was accomplished by
means of paired t tests and one-sample t tests against zero.
Control Experiment
Eighteen subjects participated in this study, of which two
had to be excluded because of technical problems (of the
16 remaining participants, 9 were women; mean age =
22.8 years). All subjects had correct or corrected-to-normal
visual acuity, and none of them reported a history of psy-
chiatric or neurological disorders. All were paid for partic-
ipation and gave written informed consent before the
experiment in accordance with the Duke University insti-
tutional review board.
The experiment consisted of two types of trial blocks,
each containing 50% of the trials. In one type of trial
blocks, the task was identical to the main experiment,
and respective data will be the focus here. The other type
of trial blocks was identical regarding trial structure, but
subjects were instructed to ignore stop signals and to re-
spond on all trials. The results of these latter trial blocks
will not be reported here. The former trial blocks were
identical to the main experiment except for two minor
modifications: (1) there were no flanking items around
the target, and (2) there were no additional control condi-
tions (yielding 80% GTs and 20% STs). Both aspects are
very unlikely to affect the results of the main experiment,
but a replication of our main finding with this paradigm
would additionally rule out any influence of these factors.
A total of approximately 470 trials was presented in the trial
blocks analyzed here.
MR data were acquired on a 3-T GE Signa MRI system.
High-resolution structural T1 (3D Fast Spoiled Gradient
Recalled (FSPGR); 1 × 1 × 1 mm resolution) and proton
density/T2-weighted images (2-D Fast Spin Echo (FSE);
1 × 1 × 1 mm resolution) were acquired for each subject.
Functional images were acquired with a reverse spiral im-
aging sequence (TR=2000msec, TE=25msec, flip angle=
75°, 32 slices with 3 × 3 × 3-mm resolution). The first five
functional images were discarded from the analysis to al-
low for steady-state magnetization.
All functional images were slice-time corrected, spatially
aligned, and normalized using the normalization pa-
rameters used to warp the high-resolution T1 image to
the SPM template. After being resampled to a resolution
of 2 × 2 × 2 mm, they were smoothed with an isotropic
8-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel and high-pass filtered
(cutoff = 128 sec). For each subject, a statistical model
was computed by applying a canonical HRF combined
with time and dispersion derivatives for each of the con-
ditions. For the purpose of this control experiment, only
the f / (b + 1) model was estimated. Analogous to the
main experiment, parametric modulators were used that
relate the functional data in GTs and STs to the RT pat-
tern in the subsequent GTs (again, only correct GTs and
STs that were followed by a correct GT were modeled,
whereas all other trial types were modeled separately
as regressors of no interest). With respect to the rela-
tively low number of STs in the control experiment and
the fact that the degree of RT slowing in GTs after SST
and UST was again nearly identical (see Results), the
analysis did not differentiate between GTs after SST and
UST. The functional data in Figure 3 is displayed on the
average of the normalized proton density images of the
individual subjects.
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RESULTS
Behavioral Results
Subjects performed very accurately on GTs (error rate =
1.4%) while also being successful in inhibiting their be-
havioral response on 51% of the STs. As is typical for this
paradigm, responses were faster on USTs than that on
GTs (455 vs. 493 msec), t(11) = 19.2, p < .001.
In addition, the RT data of the present experiment con-
firmed previous reports of response slowing to GTs fol-
lowing STs versus following GTs (STGT vs. GTGT: 498 vs.
484 msec), t(11) = 2.6, p = .026. Notably, response slow-
ing on GTs following STs was independent of whether
stopping on the preceding trial was successful or not
(SSTGT: 499 msec vs. USTGT: 497 msec, p > .8).
fMRI Results
Given that cognitive control is thought to arise as a con-
sequence of error commission or of the detection of re-
sponse conflict (Kerns et al., 2004) and given the theorized
involvement of the SN and/or VTA in cognitive control, we
hypothesized that a conflict-driven control signal from
these midbrain areas arises in response to STs, which then
entails stronger cognitive control, typically associated with
slowed responses in the subsequent GT. Importantly, in
keeping with theoretical accounts that emphasize the
similarity between general cognitive control and reinforce-
ment learning, where reduced dopamine neuron activity
is assumed to lead to behavioral adaptation, we hypoth-
esized an inverse relationship between RTs in STGT and
activity in the SN or VTA during the preceding ST.
To test this hypothesis, the hemodynamic response for
a given trial was estimated on the basis of its covariation
with the behavioral performance of the subsequent GT,
separately for GTs, SSTs, and USTs ( f / (b + 1) model).
In addition, a model relating functional activity to RT
variations in the same trial (“f/b” model) was tested (see
below). Importantly, in that we hypothesized that a puta-
tive control signal from the midbrain during STs triggers
the behavioral adjustments in subsequent GTs, its effect
should be visible only when relating the level of functional
activity elicited by STs (but not by GTs) to the degree
of RT prolongation on the subsequent GT ( f / (b + 1)
model), whereas no such relationship should be present
within a trial ( f/b model).
We first report the results of the f / (b + 1) model. This
analysis revealed a significant relationship between the
hemodynamic response in STs and the RT in the subse-
quent GT in three different brain regions: the right SN
(Figure 2A), the left insula, and the ACC (see Table 1). Im-
portantly, in all three regions, the variation of the hemo-
dynamic response was inversely related to response speed
on the subsequent GT, with the largest effect seen in the
SN. That is, increased RTs on GTs corresponded with
decreased activity during the preceding STs. Notably, the
f / (b + 1) model did not yield any significant positive
correlative relationship in any region of the acquired par-
tial volume with the RT of the next trial.
ROI Analysis
To provide a more focused overview over the relation be-
tween the RT variation and the hemodynamic response in
the SN, an ROI analysis was performed (Figure 2B; the ROI
was constructed using the average of all three parametric
modulators in the f / (b+1)model (GTGT, USTGT, SSTGT);
see Methods). In the f / (b + 1) model, parameter esti-
mates for the RT regressors USTGT and SSTGT but not for
GTGT significantly differed from zero: USTGT, t(11) =−3.1,
p = .005; SSTGT, t(11) = −2, p = .038; GTGT, p > .1.
Furthermore, a direct comparison of the RT regressors for
USTGT and SSTGT revealed no significant difference ( p >
.2), whereas activity estimates both for USTGT and SSTGT
were significantly enhanced as compared with GTGT,
t(11) =−2.2, p= .024 and t(11) =−1.9, p= .041. To pre-
view the results of the within-trial analysis in this region,
Figure 2. Results of the RT regressor analysis (mean over subjects).
(A) The f / (b + 1) model revealed a negative relationship between
hemodynamic responses in STs and RT fluctuations in the subsequent
GTs (STGT) within the right SN (MNI coordinates of local activity
maximum: x,y,z = 10,−22,−20). (B) ROI analyses revealed that this
effect was only present for the RT regressors of the GTs following
unsuccessful and SSTs (USTGT and SSTGT) in the f / (b + 1) model.
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the f/b model did not yield any significant relationship be-
tween activity in the SN and the RT in a given trial (see be-
low). Consistently, the f/b model did not yield significant
estimates related to RT regressors for GT and UST in the
SN ROI (both p > .4), suggesting that activity in the SN on
a given trial has negligible influence on RT performance on
that trial.
Control Experiment
It has been argued that the midbrain is particularly diffi-
cult to image with fMRI (DʼArdenne, McClure, Nystrom,
& Cohen, 2008; but see Duzel et al., 2009). In fact, our
main finding reports only a very small cluster of significant
voxels showing the predicted activity pattern. Hence, to
extend the data basis of our interpretation, we analyzed
data of a similar follow-up experiment that included analo-
gous conditions and permitted to analyze the effects of STs
on subsequent GT performance as in the just reported
main experiment.
Behaviorally, the RT slowing following STs in the control
experiment was even more pronounced than in the main
experiment (GTGT= 523msec; STGT= 571msec), t(15)=
5, p < .001. This slowing, again, did not depend on the
success of the previous-trial response inhibition (USTGT =
570 msec; SSTGT = 572 msec; p > .8). Critically, as in the
main experiment, an inverse relationship was observed in
the SN between the hemodynamic response to STs and
the response speed on the subsequent GT (see Figure 3;
Montreal Neurological Institute [MNI] coordinates of local
activity maximum: x,y,z = 12,−24,−14; peak t value =
4.76; cluster size = 9 voxels; SVC-corrected p value =
.022). This relation was not observed anywhere else (at
the threshold level used in the main experiment), and
again, no such relationship was observed for GTs following
GTs. Thus, the control experiment clearly replicated our
main finding that activity in the SN in STs is inversely
related to the degree of RT slowing in the subsequent GT.
Fluctuations in GTs
Given that fluctuations in SN activity on an ST systemati-
cally relate to control adjustments on the following trial,
but not to performance changes within a trial, one may
ask which neural structures are actually related to RT per-
formance within a given trial. To address this, we explored
the relationship of brain activity and RTs on a given GT
( f/b model) of the main experiment. A positive relation-
ship, that is, a larger hemodynamic response for longer RTs,
was present in a number of cortical areas including lateral
frontal, inferior parietal, and precentral regions, the latter
coinciding with the primary, supplementary, and premotor





Peak Coordinates MNI (mm)
x y z
SN* R 4 7.2 10 −22 −20
Insula L 10 6.64 −36 −2 4
ACC L/R 10 5.66 −2 18 26
Data are thresholded at p< .001 (uncorrected), with a cluster level of k= 10 and *k= 4 in the midbrain (SVC-corrected p= .018 for the SN cluster).
Neither of the cortical activations were significant on the cluster level ( p < .05) after correction for multiple comparisons with respect to the whole
acquired partial volume.
Figure 3. Relationship
between neural activity in
STs and the RT in the
subsequent GT in the
control experiment (STGT in the
f / (b + 1) model; mean over
subjects). Similar to the main
experiment, there was a
negative relationship between
hemodynamic responses in STs
and RT fluctuations in the
subsequent GTs within the right
SN (MNI coordinates of local
activity maximum: x,y,z = 12,
−24,−14).
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areas (see Table 2). The same relationshipwas found in the
left fusiform gyrus as well as bilaterally in medial frontal
areas (pre-SMA) plus the dorsal portion of the ACC (dACC)
(Figure 4A) and the insula. In the midbrain, a positive re-
lation to RT appeared in a region directly below the right
thalamus, likely representing the subthalamic nucleus
(STN; Figure 4B; see Aron & Poldrack, 2006). By contrast,
very few regions displayed a negative relationship to RT





Peak Coordinates MNI (mm)
x y z
STN* R 7 5.32 10 −16 −2
Inferior parietal cortex** L 201 9.96 −44 −32 46
5.5 −62 −22 34
5.41 −66 −32 34
Fusiform gyrus** L 86 9.87 −36 −44 −18
6.04 −46 −44 −10
4.94 −44 −54 −8
Precentral gyrus** L 151 7.5 −26 −20 70
5.94 −20 −12 72
5.9 −36 −18 62
Insula** R 39 7.48 38 0 16
Inferior parietal cortex** R 111 7.25 52 −28 40
6.57 64 −18 40
5.99 62 −24 50
Fusiform gyrus L 11 7.19 −30 −8 −34
Precentral gyrus R 23 7.15 40 −12 62
Inferior frontal cortex R 16 6.97 62 14 18
Precentral gyrus** L 90 6.77 −36 −6 46
5.91 −48 0 36
Precentral gyrus** L 72 6.45 −24 −8 56
5.26 −32 −10 54
4.60 −26 −4 48
Precentral gyrus L 16 5.99 −50 −6 44
Inferior parietal cortex R 11 5.92 50 −28 50
Insula** L 46 5.8 −34 16 10
4.44 −30 10 16
Superior frontal gyrus** R 31 5.58 28 −8 54
5.43 26 −4 64
Pre-SMA/cingulate cortex** L/R 69 5.57 2 14 50
Inferior frontal gyrus R 11 4.9 36 6 30
Insula L 14 4.75 −38 4 6
Inferior frontal gyrus** L 27 4.64 −42 12 10
Data are thresholded at p < .001 (uncorrected), with a cluster level of k = 10 and *k = 4 in the midbrain.
**p < .05 on the cluster level after correction for multiple comparisons with respect to the whole acquired partial volume.
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within trial (see Table 3), which were essentially confined
to the BG and the thalamus.
DISCUSSION
The fMRI data reported here indicate that under condi-
tions that tax cognitive control, activity changes in the
SN link in a systematic way to response speed on the sub-
sequent trial (lower SN activity in an ST being associated
with longer RTs and thus presumably greater cognitive
control in a subsequent GT). This notable pattern of
results was replicated in a second experiment. Hence,
activity in the SN in response to an ST is predictive of sub-
sequent behavioral adjustments. It is important to empha-
size that this predictive link was only observed for GTs
following STs and not for GTs followingGTs. This indicates
that the inverse relationship between SN activity and fu-
ture performance arises as a consequence of STs, presum-
ably attributable to the inherent response conflict elicited
by the opposing tendencies of initiating versus withhold-
ing a response. We assume, however, that a similar pattern
of results would also be obtained for simple performance
errors like incorrect GTs. Unfortunately, these could not
be investigated because of their small number. Notably,
Figure 4. Areas showing a
significant within-trial
correlation for GTs ( f/b model;
mean over subjects). A positive
relationship between RTs and
hemodynamic response in GTs,
that is, stronger activity for
longer RTs, was present in the
dACC/pre-SMA (A; MNI
coordinates of local activity
maximum: x,y,z = 2,14,50),
along with several other areas
and the STN (B; MNI
coordinates of local activity
maximum: x,y,z = 10,−16,−2).





Peak Coordinates MNI (mm)
x y z
Pallidum/putamen* R 45 8.79 20 4 −8
5.51 22 12 −4
4.21 26 2 −2
Thalamus* L 89 7.17 −2 −8 12
Pallidum* L 69 6.49 −22 −6 −6
6.47 −14 8 −4
6.23 −18 0 −2
Mid-frontal gyrus L 10 5.56 −38 18 52
Cerebellum L 21 5.25 −2 −48 −36
Hippocampus L 15 5.05 −36 −18 −8
Data are thresholded at p < .001 (uncorrected), with a cluster level of k = 10 (no midbrain activity at k = 4).
*p < .05 on the cluster level after correction for multiple comparisons with respect to the whole acquired partial volume.
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activity fluctuations in the SN did not correlate with the
subjectsʼ performance within the same trial. This pattern
of results is highly compatible with the notion that the
SN provides a varying control signal upon response con-
flict to adjust subsequent cognitive control.
Our results clearly speak in favor of suggestions that
activity in the midbrain modulates cortical and subcortical
regions that mediate cognitive control, potentially shar-
ing this mechanism with reward-dependent reinforce-
ment learning (Brown & Braver, 2005; Frank et al., 2005;
Montague et al., 2004; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, et al.,
2004; Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, et al., 2004;
Holroyd & Coles, 2002). In reinforcement learning, dopa-
minergic neurons in the midbrain are thought to convey
a “teaching signal” to the BG and the frontal cortex, with
reward being coded as an increase and its omission as a
decrease in dopaminergic transmission. It is assumed that
the former leads to a perseverance of rewarded actions
whereas the latter causes a change in behavior (Schultz,
2000). Several computational models have proposed that
a very similar mechanismmight underlie cognitive control
in the absence of reward, with conditions that lead to
stronger subsequent cognitive control in general, and
the commission of errors in particular, being taken as
equivalent to the omission of reward (Brown & Braver,
2005; Frank et al., 2005; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Braver
& Cohen, 2000). Thus, following those lines of interpre-
tation, conditions of increased cognitive control can be
expected to be preceded by reduced activity in the SN
or VTA. In the present studies, this appears to be reflected
in the linear negative relationship between the SN activity
during an ST and the subsequent GT RT prolongation.
The present observations may also be discussed in rela-
tion to recent pharmacological observations in rodents.
Potentially paralleling the present data, Bari, Eagle, Mar,
Robinson, and Robbins (2009) observed that lower levels
of dopamine were accompanied by slower responses in
the rodent. On the other hand, dopamine does not appear
to play a role in the actual stopping process, as stopping
seems to be rather influenced by noradrenaline, sugges-
tive of a functional dissociation of neuromodulation related
to the go and stop process (Eagle, Tufft, Goodchild, &
Robbins, 2007).
Our observations also match well with reports of dif-
ferential post-non-inhibition/post-error slowing because
of genetic polymorphisms in the dopaminergic system
(Kramer et al., 2007) or psychopharmacological inter-
ventions thereof (Zirnheld et al., 2004), which were both
accompanied by concomitant variations of the error-
related-negativity ERP component (see also Klein et al.,
2007). However, error processing per se did not appear
to be the crucial feature underlying the SN activity in our
study, as both SSTs and UST displayed a similar relation-
ship between SN activity changes and subsequent RT pro-
longation. One possibility to reconcile the current data
with those previous findings may be the idea that the SN
provides a control signal related to general response con-
flict or error likelihood, for which actual errors represent
only a special case (Brown & Braver, 2005; Yeung, Cohen,
& Botvinick, 2004; Botvinick et al., 2001). In support of
the idea that dopaminergic structures play such a role in
conflict-driven behavioral adaptation, it has been demon-
strated that patients suffering from Parkinsonʼs disease
display markedly reduced or no behavioral adaptation af-
ter high-conflict trials in the Simon task (Fielding, Georgiou-
Karistianis, Bradshaw, Millist, & White, 2005; Praamstra &
Plat, 2001). Importantly, this effect was independent of
actual task errors. Moreover, a recent behavioral study that
investigated the influence of reward on conflict adaptation
(van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2009) reported that
conflict-related RT adjustments from one trial to the next
were abolished when subjects received amonetary reward
in-between. This finding is consistent with the notion that
a dopaminergic response to the reward could overrule the
dopaminergic modulations that may have been engaged
to adapt behavior between trials in response to response
conflict.
With respect to the accounts of response conflict, one
might argue that the stop-signal paradigm does not repre-
sent one of the typical conflict paradigms (like the Stroop,
Flanker, or Simon task), thus putting it at some distance
from the above explanation. We note, however, that the
stop-signal paradigm involves a high degree of response
conflict because the tendencies of going and stopping
are at direct odds with each other. In addition, on-line per-
formance tracking constantly keeps this task in a very chal-
lenging range. Importantly, our observations argue against
explanations of the observed RT prolongation in terms of
a general “inhibitory aftereffect” (Rieger &Gauggel, 1999).
One could argue that inhibitory processes of the motor
system in STs, by virtue of an inherent slowness, spill into
the successive trial, thereby slowing performance. Al-
though this interpretationmight fit with the behavioral ob-
servation, it does not explain the pattern of brain activity
we found. In particular, there is no indication of the SN
being involved in response speed or response inhibition
per se, as indicated by the lack of a significant relationship
to RTs within trials. Furthermore, such inhibitory after-
effects would be expected throughout the motor system
and not only in the SN—a pattern not observed here.
Another important issue pertains to the broader
systems-level context, in which the SN signal arises and
exerts its influence and consequently to the precise role
that the SN plays in the larger process. It has been demon-
strated that ACC plays an important role during the de-
tection of conflict, which appears to be important for
subsequent adaptation (e.g., Kerns et al., 2004). The pres-
ent study, however, found a more robust relationship to
the subsequent behavior in the SN. Nonetheless, this
should not be taken to indicate that ACC does not play
an important role in the process but rather that it might
do so in a fashion that does not result in an equally strong
linear relationship between its activity level and the subse-
quent behavioral adjustment. Although the exact functional
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relationship between ACC and the SN is not yet clear, the
existence of bidirectional connections between these two
areas (Seamans & Yang, 2004; Carr & Sesack, 2000), along
with influential models proposing a tight functional link
between them (e.g., Holroyd & Coles, 2002), suggests that
they act in some sort of joint manner. The precise nature
of this interaction and thus their respective roles and ac-
tivation sequence under varying conditions remain to be
determined. In our view, it seems likely that the central
function subserved by the SN is to link the detection of a
need for a behavioral adjustment in a given trial to the ac-
tual implementation of that adjustment in the subsequent
trial, providing a bridge across time in the process.
In the present study, when examining the determinants
of response speed in GTs (i.e., the f/b model), a wide-
spread network of cortical and subcortical structures was
identified. In the stop-signal paradigm, GTs always have
the potential to turn into STs, thus necessitating titra-
tion of the optimal RT (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009; Jaffard
et al., 2008; Vink et al., 2005). Thus, it does not seem sur-
prising that most areas that were identified displayed a
positive within-trial relationship to RT (stronger activity
for longer RTs). Other studies, however, also reported
positive correlations between RT and various brain areas
that might not necessarily be related to an active delaying
mechanism (Yarkoni et al., 2009;Weissman et al., 2006). In
the current study, areas in the frontal, insular, and parietal
cortex weremore active for long RTs in the within-GT anal-
ysis, as were various motor areas, the fusiform gyrus, the
dACC/pre-SMA, and the STN. The opposite relationship
was found in parts of the BG and the thalamus. It is not
possible in the current study to pinpoint the actual locus
where the control signal from the midbrain (elicited by a
preceding ST) impacts this network. However, there are
known projections from the SN to the medial frontal cor-
tex, including the dACC/pre-SMA, that area thought to
serve modulatory functions (Quilodran, Rothe, & Procyk,
2008). In fact, dACC/pre-SMA has previously been impli-
cated in post-error slowing (Marco-Pallares, Camara,Munte,
& Rodriguez-Fornells, 2008; Debener et al., 2005), which
may be accomplished by influencing the lateral frontal cor-
tex to actually change neural processing in the subsequent
trial (Li et al., 2008; Kerns et al., 2004). Alternatively or in
addition, SN activity might influence the activity in the
striatum and the STN, as both receive inputs from the SN
and have been implicated in response inhibition (Frank,
Samanta, Moustafa, & Sherman, 2007; Kempf et al., 2007;
Frank, 2006; Vink et al., 2005). A role of the STN has been
explicitly demonstrated for inhibitory motor control in
a stop-signal paradigm (Aron, Behrens, Smith, Frank, &
Poldrack, 2007; Aron & Poldrack, 2006). Potentially, the
STN may not only be engaged for outright stopping of a
motor response, as suggested by these studies, but might
also be engaged to exert a global no-go-signal on the BG
that “buys time” to further elaborate on a response in the
sense of a time-accuracy trade-off (Frank et al., 2007; Frank,
2006). Concerning activity in the STN in the present study,
some caution has to be applied because we did not have
a specific a priori hypothesis, and its activity did not sur-
vive family-wise error correction. We think, however, in
view of the theoretical framework presented above, it is
not unlikely that the STNwas indeed active in the reported
contrast.
Clearly, SN activity cannot be equated to dopaminergic
transmission in the target areas (Seamans & Yang, 2004),
and animal physiology has started to discover that differ-
ent dopamine neurons react differently to positive and
negative reinforcers (Matsumoto & Hikosaka, 2009). On
the relatively coarse level of human fMRI studies, however,
studies investigating reward have demonstrated effects
bearing the signature of well-described reward-related do-
paminergic mechanisms seen in animals (e.g., DʼArdenne
et al., 2008; Wittmann et al., 2005). Furthermore, a recent
study using PET/fMRI in parallel also speaks in favor of a
strong relationship between SN/ VTA activity and dopa-
minergic neurotransmission (Schott et al., 2008). An ad-
ditional, relatively indirect indication derives from the
delayed timing with which the activity in the SN seems
to impact behavioral performance in this study, which ap-
pears to be consistent with a slower neuromodulatory
mechanism (Seamans & Yang, 2004). It therefore appears
likely that the effects demonstrated in this study reflect
at least in part the dopaminergic output of the SN.
Finally, our fMRI data do not allow to unequivocally
distinguish between the SN pars compacta (that contains
the majority of dopaminergic neurons in humans) and the
SN pars reticulata. On the one hand, this is due to the lim-
ited spatial resolution, but also because the two structures
are highly interwoven, especially in humans (for a discus-
sion of using fMRI to investigate the dopaminergic mid-
brain structures in humans, see Duzel et al., 2009). The
SN pars reticulata, however, has also been implicated in
cognitive functions that might bear to some extent on
the interpretation of the present data (Frank, Loughry, &
OʼReilly, 2001). With respect to the theoretical framework
provided by different models of the involvement of dopa-
mine in cognitive control, however, we believe that the
SN pars compacta is the more likely neural substrate in
the present study.
Taken together, our data indicate that under high de-
mands for maintaining flexible cognitive control, activity
in the SN becomes predictive of future performance, with
decreased activity leading to longer RTs in the subse-
quent trial. We suggest that this conditional dependency
refers to the operation of a dopaminergic control signal
that bears strong similarities to the dopaminergic “teach-
ing signal” previously reported in reward-dependent re-
inforcement learning. A disturbance of this signal might
diminish the ability to flexibly adapt oneʼs behavior, which
is a psychopathological feature of a number of neuro-
psychiatric disorders (Montague et al., 2004; Nieoullon,
2002). Our findings might therefore provide new in-
sights into the mechanistic dysfunctions underlying these
conditions.
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